THE STATE DUMA

Based on Nystén-Haarala, Soili: Russian Law in Transition: Law and Institutional Change. Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute (Kikimora Publications), 2001.

The lower chamber of the Parliament is the 450-member State Duma. The jurisdiction of the Duma lies primarily in passing legislation and approving the budget, ratifying international treaties and deciding on some important appointments to official posts. Of particular importance, in terms of influencing the actions of the President and the Government, is confirmation of the President's nominee for Prime Minister, the procedures for a vote of no confidence in the Government, and the right to initiate proceedings of impeachment against the President.

However, in situations of conflict the Duma will generally have to bow to the will of the President and the Government, as the President can in principle dissolve the Duma whenever he wants to, for instance if the Duma refuses to approve the President's nominee for Prime Minister. The Duma does have some measure of protection in this area, such as the constitutional prohibition against dissolving the Duma within one year after its election or during a state of emergency or martial law decreed by the President.

Russian politics was marked throughout the 1990s by the stand-off between President Yeltsin and the Duma. Rather than seeking compromise in order to build a coalition with the Duma to support the executive, Yeltsin relied on his powers, threatening to dissolve the Duma to back his adopted tactics of keeping the opposition divided and uncertain. This approach was largely successful. Admittedly, the Duma has been able to wield a certain "negative power" against the executive in its ability to block or slow down the progress of business promoted by the executive. But in the final analysis, the Duma always ended up on the losing side during the Yeltsin era - partly due to its own internal divisions.

It proved unable to launch impeachment procedures against the President - the final attempt ground to a halt in spring 1999 - and in most cases it had to unconditionally accept the President's nominations for Prime Minister in the face of the threat of dissolution. Furthermore, the President was not entirely dependent on the legislative process in the Duma, as, when necessary, he could implement his decisions by presidential decree.

The only important exception to this practical division of powers in favour of the President was the situation in the aftermath of the economic crisis of autumn 1998, when the Duma successfully rejected Yeltsin's candidate for Prime Minister and pushed through Yevgeni Primakov as a compromise candidate, managing at the same time to influence the composition of the Government. In contrast, the surprise changes of Prime Minister in 1999 once again followed the same presidential formula. The experience of 1998 nevertheless showed that under the present constitutional arrangements the prevailing political situation at any given time will influence the actual division of powers - depending on how strong and united the Duma feels itself to be, and how keen the executive is to avoid the possibility of social unrest.